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improvements, the payments were not considered income
from self-employment.13 By continuing to carry on farming
operations and to raise whatever was possible under the
circumstances, the landowner was arguably materially
participating in the farming operation separately from the
status of the individual as lessor of interests in the land to
the steel company. In effect, the landowner-farmer was both
lessor and farm tenant. The important point is that the
taxpayer was allowed to wear two hats for purposes of
liability for self-employment tax.
In the other 1960 ruling,14 a gasoline station owner had
leased the station to an oil company under an “owner’s
lease.” The station owner received a flat rental plus a
percentage of gasoline sales. The rental payments were not
considered to be income from self-employment regardless
of whether the station owner or a third party operated the
station. The station owner was materially participating in
the business to which the station was effectively leased.15
Importance of formalities
For any situation in which an individual occupies a dual
status, one status being a lessor, it is important for the lease
to be in writing with standard terms and conditions calling
for a reasonable rental. At the same time, it is important for
the status as partner, employee or LLC member to be
formally established and maintained.
In conclusion
It should be noted that Mizell involved a partnership
arrangement, not that of employee of a corporation or
member of an LLC. However, it seems doubtful that the
Miz ll court would draw a distinction among the three
statuses. Whether lines will be drawn among the various
types of relationships by other courts remains to be seen.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 6 Harl, Agricultural Law § 50.02 (1996);
Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 7.01 (1996).  See also
Harl, “Renting Property to One’s Corporation,” 6 Agric.
L. Dig. 57 (1995).
2 See 6 Harl, supra n. 1, § 50.02[2].
3 Mizell v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-571.
4 Id.
5 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1).
6 Id.
7 Id
8 Id
9 Harl, “Renting Property to One’s Corporation,” 6 Agric.
L. Dig. 57 (1995).
10 Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(b).
11 Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(d).
12 1960-1 C.B. 357.
13 Id.
14 Rev. Rul. 60-112, 1960-1 C.B. 354.
15 Id.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
POSSESSION. The disputed strip of land was used by
the plaintiffs or their predecessors for over 70 years for
pasturing livestock, hunting, fishing, and harvesting timber.
The disputed land was not fit for cultivation or development
because it often flooded; thus, the primary usefulness of the
land was for the purposes for which the plaintiffs used it.
The court held that although the plaintiffs’ use of the land
was sporadic, the plaintiffs’ use was sufficient given the
nature of the land. The plaintiffs exercised exclusive
possession by prohibiting the defendants from removing
timber from the land. Until a few years before the action
was brought and a survey was completed, the defendants
and everyone else in the area considered the land as
belonging to the plaintiffs. The court held that the plaintiffs
had established title to the land by adverse possession.
Whiteside v. Rottger, 913 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995).
BANKRUPTCY
     GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
ESTATE PROPERTY . The debtor operated an auction
business and performed an auction of a third party’s
personal business property. The debtor deposited the
proceeds of the auction in the debtor’s general bank account
and later issued a check to the third party for the net
proceeds. The check was issued within 90 days before the
debtor filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee sought
to recover the payment as a preferential transfer. The lower
courts had held that the transfer was not preferential because
the elationship between the debtor and third party was an
a ent-principal relationship and not a debtor-creditor
r lationship. The trustee appealed, arguing that once the
aucti n was over and the proceeds were deposited in he
debtor’s bank account, the agency relationship terminated
and the ebtor and third party became debtor and creditor.
Th  app llate court agreed with the trustee, noting that the
debtor’s account showed a negative balance during a portion
of the time between the deposit of the proceeds and the
issu nce of the check and the proceeds were not identifiable
in the ccount. The court also placed emphasis on the third
party’s l ck of control over the proceeds once deposited by
the debtor. The court acknowledged that an auctioneer is an
agent of the owner of the property auctioned, but there is no
discussion of how depositing the proceeds in a general bank
account terminates the agency relationship. The holding
here seems to have resulted from the court’s isolation of the
issuance of the check from the auction transaction, based on
a termination of the agency relationship sometime after the
auction ended. In re Rine & Rine Auctioneers, Inc., 74
F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1996).
JURISDICTION . The debtor was a produce dealer
licensed under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities
Act. Sev ral sellers of produce had filed claims against the
PACA trust. The trust res was held by a secured creditor of
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the debtor and the sellers sought recovery from that res. The
bankruptcy trustee brought an action in the debtor’s
bankruptcy case to recover the PACA trust res from the
creditor. The court held that it did not have core or other
jurisdiction over the controversy because the PACA trust res
was not bankruptcy estate property and resolution of the
action would not assist in administration of the bankruptcy
estate. In re United Fruit & Vegetable, Inc., 191 B.R. 445
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1996).
   FEDERAL TAXATION   -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY . After the debtors filed for
bankruptcy, the IRS made an assessment of their taxes and
filed a claim in the case. After the debtors objected to the
claim, the IRS filed for retroactive relief from the automatic
stay to validate the claim. The debtors argued that the
assessment was void; however, the court held that the
automatic stay would be retroactively lifted as to the IRS so
that the assessment was valid. In re Siverling, 96-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,134 (E.D. Calif. 1996).
CLAIMS . The case involved two bankruptcy cases, one
with a claims bar date in November 1992 and one with a
claims bar date in February 1995. The IRS received notice
of both claims bar dates but did not file a claim in both cases
until November 1995 for priority tax claims. In neither case
had any distribution of estate property taken place before the
IRS filed its claims. The court held that in both cases the
IRS claims were allowed as tardily filed claims and that the
lateness of the claims did not affect the claims’ priority
status. In re M.A.P. Restaurant, Inc., 191 B.R. 519
(Bankr. D. R.I. 1996).
DISCHARGE . The debtor had failed to pay federal
income taxes for several years and the IRS sought a ruling
that the taxes were nondischargeable for willful attempt to
evade taxes. The court found that the debtor knew that the
taxes were owed and that the debtor had sufficient income
to pay the taxes but used the income to pay discretionary
personal expenses such as private college education for the
debtor’s children and vacations. The court also found that
the debtor took several actions to defeat IRS attempts to
levy on the debtor’s property, such as not using any bank
accounts. The court held that the taxes were
nondischargeable for willful attempt to evade taxes. In re
Wright, 191 B.R. 291 (S.D. N.Y. 1995).
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES . The taxpayer filed for
Chapter 11 in August 1991. The debtor had pre-petition
passive activity losses and the bankruptcy estate had post-
petition passive activity losses. The Chapter 11 plan
provided for transfer of estate property, including interests
in a partnership, to the debtor prior to termination of the
case. The IRS ruled that the retransfer of estate property to
the taxpayer prior to termination of the case was not a
taxable distribution of the property and that the PALs
attributable to that property also passed to the taxpayer. Ltr.
Rul. 9611028, Dec. 14, 1995.
PRIORITY . The debtors were assessed for pre-petition
income tax deficiencies resulting from investments in tax
shelters. The assessments included interest under I.R.C. §
6621(d) for substantial underpayments attributable to tax
motivated transactions. The court held that the pre-petition
in er t was a priority tax claim. In re Hall, 191 B.R. 814
(Bankr. D. Alaska 1995).
The debtors had filed three previous bankruptcy cases
between 1986 and the filing of the current case in November
1994. Between the first and second case and between the
third and present case only a few months passed. However,
between the second and third cases, almost three years
passed. The IRS had filed claims for 1984 taxes in all the
cases. The IRS argued that the three year period of Section
507(a)(8)(A)(i) was tolled during the previous bankruptcy
cases and that the additional tolling period of six months
allowed by I.R.C. § 6503 was created by each case. Thus,
the IRS argument was that the total tolled period was the
length of the bankruptcy cases plus 18 months. The court
held that the IRS was not allowed an additional six month
tolling period for each bankruptcy case filed. The court also
held that, on equity grounds, the IRS would not allow
priority status because the IRS had ample time of almost
three years between the second and third cases to collect the
taxes. In re Dodson, 191 B.R. 869 (Bankr. D. Or. 1996).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has adopted as final
regulations adding a noninsured crop disaster assistance
program to protect producers of crops for which insurance is
not vailable. 61 Fed. Reg. 7193 (Feb. 27, 1996).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION . The decedent had
created a revocable trust which became irrevocable upon the
decedent’s death. The trust provided that the trust be divided
into two trusts. The trusts provided for distribution of net
income to the beneficiary, discretionary distribution of trust
corpus and the remainder to a charitable organization. The
beneficiaries disclaimed the right to the discretionary
distributions of principal within nine months after the
decedent’s death. The estate representative then petitioned
the state probate court for reformation of the trusts to
provide for annuity payments of 7.4 percent of the fair
market value of the trust assets. The IRS ruled that the
reformation qualified the trusts as charitable remainder
unitrusts eligible for the charitable deduction. Ltr. Rul
9610005, Nov. 9, 1995.
DISCLAIMERS- ALM § 5.02[6].* The decedent’s
spouse had died before the decedent and the decedent had
instructed counsel to draw up a written disclaimer of a
portion of the predeceased spouse’s estate. However, the
decedent died before the disclaimer was written and
executed. The heirs of the predeceased spouse and the heirs
of the decedent agreed to a division of the estates which was
similar to the division which would have occurred had the
decedent executed the disclaimer. The agreement was
submitted to a state probate court and signed by the heirs’
attorneys and some of the heirs. The court held that the
agreement was not sufficient as a disclaimer because not all
of the heirs signed the agreement and the agreement was not
a disclaimer executed by the decedent’s heirs for the
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decedent but was an agreement for division of the estates.
The court also held that the portion of the estate which
passed to the predeceased spouse’s heirs was not an allowed
claim against the decedent’s estate because the predeceased
spouse’s heirs did not have an enforceable claim against the
decedent’s estate. Estate of Delaune v. U.S., 96-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,221 (M.D. La. 1996).
The surviving spouse of the decedent petitioned the state
probate court for protective orders for disclaimers by the
decedent’s minor children of their interests in the decedent’s
estate. The probate court granted the orders and the
disclaimers were filed, resulting in passage of the property
to the surviving spouse. The IRS argued that the disclaimers
were invalid under state law because the disclaimers were
not in the best interests of the children and would be
reversed by the state appellate court. The Tax Court held
that the disclaimers were in the best interests of the children
because the disclaimers would result in larger inheritances
and would keep the family corporation within the family.
The IRS has issued a nonacquiescence as to the case
because the Tax Court used the wrong standard of appellate
review of the state court decision. E t. of Goree v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-331, nonacq., I.R.B. 1996-__.
The decedent died within nine months after the death of
the decedent’s spouse. The decedent and spouse had owned
a joint bank account and joint certificates of deposit as
tenants by the entireties, and the decedent’s executor filed a
written disclaimer of half of the funds in the account and
half of the certificates of deposit within nine months after
the death of the spouse. The IRS ruled that, under
Pennsylvbania law, joint bank accounts and joint certificates
of deposit were considered as contributed half by each joint
owner; therefore, the disclaimers were effective. Note: the
IRS position has been that interests in tenancy by the
entireties property are not disclaimabl;e by the surviving
spouse, See e.g., Ltr. Rul. 9427003, March 30, 1994.  Ltr.
Rul. 9612002, Nov. 7, 1995.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS- ALM §
5.04[6].* On the decedent’s death, the decedent held a
lifetime income interest in an irrevocable marital trust
established by the decedent’s predeceased spouse in 1974.
The decedent held a testamentary general power of
appointment over the trust corpus but did not exercise the
power. The trust corpus passed to the predeceased spouse’s
grandchildren. The court held that the trust was subject to
GSTT because the decedent’s failure to exercise the general
power of appointment was a constructive addition to the
trust occurring after the effective date of the GSTT. The
court also held that the application of GSTT to the trust did
not violate the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution
because the tax resulted from the decedent’s actions after
enactment of GSTT and did not violate the equal protection
clause because a rational basis supported application of the
tax to the decedent’s actions. E. Norman Peterson Marital
Trust v. Comm’r, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,225 (2d
Cir. 1996), aff’g, 102 T.C. 798 (1994).
MARITAL DEDUCTION- ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent had established an inter vivos trust which created,
upon the decedent’s death, a qualified terminable interest
trust for the decedent’s surviving spouse. The trust gave the
executor or trustee the discretion as to how much trust
property to include in the QTIP trust. The IRS argued that
th  trustee had a power of appointment over the trust,
disqualifying the trust as QTIP. The court cited cases from
th  Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal which
held that the power of an executor to determine how much
property to transfer to a trust did not disqualify the trust as
QTIP. The Tax Court followed those decisions. Mathi  v.
U.S., 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) § 60,224 (N.D. Ind.
1996).
POWER OF APPOINTMENT . The decedent’s estate
inclu ed an interest in a trust established by the decedent’s
predeceased spouse. The trust named the decedent as
beneficiary and trustee and provided for the trustee to have
th  disc tionary power to distribute trust corpus to the
dece ent as “may be reasonably necessary for her comfort,
support and maintenance.” The IRS claimed that the
decedent had a general power of appointment over the trust
corpus; therefore, the trust corpus was included in the
decedent’s gross estate under I.R.C. § 2041(b). The court
held that the decedent did not have a general power of
appointment because the power to distribute trust corpus
was subject to an ascertainable standard. Essentially, the
court held that, under state (Nebraska) law, the inclusion of
the term “comfort” did not extend the trustee’s power to
distribute corpus beyond the decedent’s health, support and
maintenance needs. Best v. U.S., 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,223 (D. Neb. 1995).
VALUATION . The decedent’s estate contained an
interes  in a promissory note issued by a corporation to the
decedent’s predeceased spouse. The note was a private
obl gation in that the note did not include any protective
language found in the public debt instruments issued by the
corporation. The fair market value of the note was
determined by comparing it to similar public debt
instruments issued by the corporation. The estate argued that
the estate tax valuation should be determined by discounting
the fair market value of the note to account for the lack of
protective documents found in the publicly traded debt
instruments. The court agreed and accepted the estate’s
valuation of the note. Smith v. U.S., 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,222 (S.D. Miss. 1996).
The decedent was a majority shareholder in a small
closely-held corporation. The shareholders had entered into
a stock r trictive sale agreement in 1960 which provided
for redemption of stock if a shareholder left the company. In
1987, as part of the decedent’s plan to leave control of the
company with an employee but to reduce the estate tax
burden on the decedent’s heirs, the decedent executed
another stock buy-sell agreement which established the
value of the stock for redemption by the decedent’s estate.
Any unredeemed stock was to pass to the employee. The
corporation was required to redeem so much of the
decedent’s stock as necessary to pay federal and state taxes
on the estate. The court held that the agreement was not
unenforceable because of I.R.C. § 2703, because the stock
agreement was executed prior to the effective date of I.R.C.
§ 2703. However, the buy-sell agreement was held to be
ineffective to set the stock value because the agreement had
a testamentary purpose. Therefore, the stock was valued at
fair market value at the time of the decedent’s death
(actually, in this case the alternate valuation date was
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elected). Estate of Glockner v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1996-148.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS EXPENSE. The taxpayer was a general
partner in a real estate development partnership. The debtor
did not participate in the management of partnership affairs
and only consulted with another general partner about
partnership affairs. The taxpayer filed a suit for an
accounting from the partnership and claimed the legal fees
as a business deduction. The court held that the taxpayer’s
involvement with the partnership was insufficient to qualify
the taxpayer’s activities as a trade or business; therefore, the
legal fees were not a deductible business expense. In re
Hendrickson, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,133 (C.D.
Calif. 1996).
The taxpayer was employed by OSHA and claimed
deductions for charitable contributions and business
expenses. The taxpayer had few records to support the
claimed deductions and much of the charitable deduction
was disallowed. One of the business expenses claimed was
for a computer printer used by the taxpayer at home. The
taxpayer admitted that the printer was not purchased as a
condition of employment and was not required for the
taxpayer’s employment. The court held that the cost of the
printer was not an allowable business deduction. McCann
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-120.
The taxpayers operated several businesses and claimed a
variety of deductions, none of which was substantiated by
written records during the IRS audit or before the trial in
this case. However, on the last day of trial, the taxpayers
presented 22 boxes of unorganized records as evidence to
support their deduction claims. Although the court allowed
some time to organize the records, the taxpayers failed to
present the records in an organized fashion. The court held
for the IRS on all deduction claims based on the taxpayers’
failure to provide evidence otherwise. Leav ll v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1996-117.
The taxpayer was a corporation owned by one
shareholder. The shareholder owned several horses which
the shareholder entered into various equestrian
competitions. The shareholder originally owned a farm
where the horses were bred and raised; however, the
shareholder sold the farm and boarded the horses at a stable
owned by other individuals. The shareholder caused the
corporation to adopt a resolution to sponsor the horses
owned by the shareholder in order to promote the
corporation’s products through the naming of the horses
after the corporation’s products. None of the horses was
named after the corporation’s products, however. The
corporation paid for advertisements in show horse industry
publications and claimed the expenses as business expenses
of the corporation. The court held that the expenses were not
related to the corporation’s trade or business but were
payments for the shareholder’s personal expenses and not
deductible as business expenses. Midwest Industrial
Supply, Inc., T.C. Memo. 1996-130.
C CORPORATIONS-ALM  § 7.02.*
LOAN OR CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION. The taxpayer
was an 80 percent owner of a family corporation. The
taxpayer made several “loans” to the corporation over
several years, none of which was repaid. Using a higher
level of scrutiny for transactions between a shareholder and
a closely-held corporation, the court held that the “loans”
were actually capital contributions because (1) the
corporation could not obtain loans from third parties, (2) the
funds transferred had a high risk of nonrepayment, (3) the
corporation was thinly capitalized with several years of
negative equity, (4) the “loans” were subordinated to other
corporation debt, and (5) no interest or return of principal
was ever paid on the loans. The corporation had declared
some of the loans as worthless and the taxpayer claimed a
bad debt deduction. The deduction was denied because the
loans were held to be capital contributions. Kadlec v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-119.
CASUALTY LOSSES-ALM  § 4.05[2][a].* The IRS
has issued a Coordinated Issue Paper which restates the IRS
position that no casualty loss deduction may be claimed for
amage to standing timber from an epidemic attack of
southern pine beetles.  The IRS noted that a noncasualty loss
may be allowed for timber which was damaged to the point
of being unsalvageable. Nonrecognition of gain treatment
for an involuntary conversion is not available for the cutting
of healthy trees around an infected area with the proceeds
used to purchase other timber property. “Forest Products
Industry—Losses of Timber Following an Epidemic
Att ck of Southern Pine Beetles,” Coordinated Issue
Paper, 96 ARD 050-10.
COOPERATIVES- ALM § 14.03.* The taxpayer was a
rural telephone cooperative. The cooperative was not tax-
exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(12) nor was the cooperative
governe  by subchapter T. The cooperative issued a
“st tement of Patronage Credit” to patrons instead of
distributing the net proceeds. The IRS ruled that the
cooperative could deduct the amount of the certificates from
the cooperative’s gross income on Form 1120. Ltr. Rul.
9610001, Sept. 26, 1995; Ltr. Rul. 9610002, Sept. 26,
1995; Ltr. Rul. 9610003, Sept. 26, 1995.
DEPRECIATION . The following case citation in Vol
7, No. 6 was incorrect. Maschmeyer's Nursery, Inc. v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-78.
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS . The taxpayer was an
employer whose severance plan provided coverage of
terminated employees under the employer’s medical plan
for 18 months after termination of employment. The
medical plan was qualified under I.R.C. §§ 105 and 106 and
provided for payment of 82 percent of the premiums for the
first twelve months by the employer and full payment by the
terminated employee for the last six months. The IRS ruled
that the terminated employees would be considered
employees such that the employer contributions would be
excluded from the terminated employees’ gross income.
Ltr. Rul. 9612008, Dec. 18, 1995.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES . The taxpayer owned an
apartment complex and decided to sell the property in order
to acquire other similar property. The sale agreement
provided that the purchasers would participate in finding
and purchasing, through an escrow agent, properties to
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exchange for the apartment complex. However, the taxpayer
made all the inquiries about suitable properties and
presented a list of 20 properties to the escrow agent, two of
which were selected and purchased with the escrow funds.
The second property was not purchased until 194 days after
the sale of the apartment complex. The court held that the
first sale qualified for like-kind tax free treatment. The court
noted that regulations promulgated after the transactions
limit to three the number of properties that can be identified,
Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(K)-1(c)(4), but that the statute did not
contain a limit. The court held that the second sale did not
qualify for like-kind exchange treatment because the sale
occurred more than 180 days after the sale of the apartment
complex. St. Laurent v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-150.
MITIGATION CREDITS . The taxpayer owned some
land next to one of its manufacturing plants. The taxpayer
decided to restore the wetlands nature of the land to obtain
wetlands mitigation credits for use against other
developments of wetlands, sell a conservation easement on
the property to the state, and eventually deed the property to
the state when the credits are used up. The easement would
leave the taxpayer with only bare title to the land. The IRS
ruled (1) the sale of the easement would be considered a sale
of the entire property, (2) the final deeding of the land to the
state would not result in any gain or loss to the taxpayer, (3)
the easement would be treated as a capital asset and the sale
would produce capital gain or loss, (4) the exchange of
wetland mitigation credits would qualify for like-kind
exchange treatment, (5) the amounts expended to create the
wetlands credit would be included in the basis of the credits,
and (6) the taxpayer could recognize gain or loss on the sale
or exchange of a mitigation credit. Ltr. Rul. 9612009, Dec.
18, 1995.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in February
1996, the weighted average is 6.98 percent with the
permissible range of 6.28 to 7.53 percent (90 to 109 percent
permissable range) and 6.28 to 7.67 percent (90 to 110
percent permissable range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 96-
16, I.R.B. 1996-__.
RESCISSION. The taxpayer owned stock in a
corporation and the stock was held by the taxpayer’s broker.
In January 1989, the taxpayer gave the broker an order to
sell $100,000 of the stock but the broker sold 100,000
shares of stock. The broker and taxpayer eventually
negotiated a repurchase of most of the stock in the same
corporation but not the repurchase of the same stock sold by
mistake in January. The taxpayer argued that the repurchase
of stock was a rescission of the sale of the original stock and
entitled to nonrecognition of gain treatment to the extent of
the repurchase of the stock. Under Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-1
C.B. 181 where a contract of sale is canceled or rescinded in
the same year of the sale such that the buyer and seller are
returned to their original status, the seller does not recognize
gain on the original sale. The court held that R v. Rul. 80-58
did not apply in this case because the original sale of stock
was not canceled or rescinded as between the taxpayer and
the buyers of the stock. The court also held that the gain
could not be deferred as an involuntary conversion and
substitution of equivalent property because the broker was
never shown to be criminally or civilly liable for the sale of
the stock. Hutcheson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-127.
RENT DEDUCTION. The following case citation in
Vol 7, No. 6 was incorrect. Maschmeyer's Nursery, Inc. v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1996-78.
RETURNS. The taxpayer sought to present evidence of
the m iling of a tax return by oral testimony. The IRS
argued at, under I.R.C. § 7502(c), the only exceptions to
physi al delivery of a tax return are a postmark on the
envelope containing the return or a registration or
certification of the package. Under the statute, a registration
or certification is prima facie evidence of delivery to the
IRS on the date of the registration or certification. The
taxpayer argued that the common law rule that placing a
postpaid and properly addressed envelope containing the
return in a mail box created a rebuttable presumption of
delivery of the envelope. Although the court acknowledged
contrar  decisions in the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeal, the court held that the common law rule did not
apply to federal tax returns which were governed
exclusively by I.R.C. § 7502(c). In the matter of Beautiful
Plants b Charlie, Inc., 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,147 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME. The taxpayer
corporation owned an apartment building. The corporation
provided heat and hot water to the tenants and managed the
buildings through a management company, employees of
the corporation and third party contractors. The IRS ruled
that the rent from the buildings would not be passive
investment income to the corporation. Ltr. Rul. 9610016,
Dec. 6, 1995.
The taxpayer was an S corporation which owned an
office building rented to business tenants. The corporation
provided management, maintenance and operations services
for the building and tenants and employed several people to
perform these tasks. The management of the building was
performed by a management company under contract with
the taxpayer. The IRS ruled that the rent from the building
would not be passive investment income to the corporation.
Ltr. Rul. 9611009, Dec. 6, 1995.
REORGANIZATION. An S corporation reorganized
into two corporations under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D), a “type
D” reorganization. During the reorganization, the initial S
corporation held stock of both corporations for a short time.
The IRS ruled that the ownership of the stock of both
corporations during a “type D” reorganization did not
terminate the original corporation’s subchapter S election.
Ltr. Rul. 9611016, Dec. 11, 1995.
TRUSTS. The taxpayers created 23 non-reversionary,
irrevocable trusts, one for each child and grandchild. The
trusts were identical except for the trustee and beneficiary.
The trusts provided (1) the trust would have only one
beneficiary, (2) trust corpus could be distributed only to the
current beneficiary, (3) the income interest terminated at the
earlier of the death of the beneficiary or the termination of
the trust, (4) if the trust terminated during the life of the
beneficiary, the trust corpus was to be distributed to the
beneficiary, and (5) all income was to be distributed
currently. The IRS ruled that the trusts were qualified
subchapter S trusts. Ltr. Rul. 9611021, Dec. 13, 1995.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayer owned a
residence prior to getting married. After the marriage, the
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taxpayer decided to sell the residence and move into the
spouse’s residence. The old residence was sold for a gain.
The spouse transferred a one-half interest in the marital
house to the taxpayer in consideration for the taxpayer’s
assumption of one-half of the outstanding mortgage on the
house. The couple expended funds on the renovation of the
marital house. The taxpayer claimed a deferral of gain on
the sale of the old residence because the amount of the
entire assumed mortgage plus the full costs of the
renovations exceeded the net sale proceeds of the old
residence. The court found that, under state law, the
taxpayer was not liable for the entire mortgage amount and
reduced that amount to one-half of the outstanding mortgage
amount. The court also found that the taxpayer failed to
demonstrate that the taxpayer individually paid for all of the
renovations to the marital residence and reduced that
amount to one-half of the total costs. Because the adjusted
sales price of the old residence exceeded the taxpayer’s one-
half share of the mortgage and renovation costs by more
than the gain realized in the sale of the old residence, the
taxpayer was required to recognize all of the gain on the sale
of the old residence. F ldman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1996-132.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
April 1996
Annual Semi-annualQuarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.33 5.26 5.23 5.20
110% AFR 5.87 5.79 5.75 5.72
120% AFR 6.41 6.31 6.26 6.23
Mid-term
AFR 5.88 5.80 5.76 5.73
110% AFR 6.48 6.38 6.33 6.30
120% AFR 7.08 6.96 6.90 6.86
Long-term
AFR 6.51 6.41 6.36 6.33
110% AFR 7.17 7.05 6.99 6.95
120% AFR 7.84 7.69 7.62 7.57
THEFT LOSSES. The taxpayer invested in a tax shelter
for the sole purpose of gaining a deduction in excess of the
investment. Although the taxpayer received advice from an
accountant to be wary of such investments, the taxpayer
made the investment without investigating the company or
the tax consequences of the investment. The IRS rejected
the taxpayer’s deductions based on the tax shelter
investment. The taxpayer argued that the original
investment was a theft loss because the tax shelter agent
misled the taxpayer as to the deductibility of the tax
shelter’s claimed deductions. The court held that the
investment was not eligible for a theft loss deduction
because the taxpayer failed to take reasonable steps to
investigate the tax shelter and invested in the tax shelter
after contrary advice from an accountant. Jones v. U.S., 96-
1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,136 (N.D. Calif. 1996).
TRAVEL EXPENSES . The IRS has issued updated
procedures for determining the amount of travel expense
which will be deemed substantiated where a per diem
allowance is made under a reimbursement or other expense
allowance arrangement. The updated procedures also
provide an optional method for employees and self-
employed individuals for computing the deductible costs of
business meal and incidental expenses incurred while
traveling away from home. The new procedures are
effective April 1, 1996. Rev. Proc. 96-28, I.R.B. 1996-14,
r vising Rev. Proc. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 825.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
DAMAGES. The plaintiffs were tomato growers who
purchased a frost protection chemical manufactured by the
defendant. Although the chemical was applied correctly, the
cr p received damage from the chemical. The plaintiffs
sought recovery of lost profits, i.e. economic damages, in an
action for negligent misrepresentation. The plaintiffs
claimed that the advertising, labels and oral representations
by the defendant’s representations were false and
misleading. The issue, a certified question from the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, was whether the plaintiff had
all ged sufficient facts to support an action for negligent
misrepresentation. The cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation is defined by Section 552 of the
Restatem nt (Second) of Torts to involve the failure to
exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating information about a product. The court held
that the plaintiffs had not alleged any facts supporting any
claim that the defendant was negligent in communicating
any information. Instead, the allegations supported the claim
that the information itself was faulty. The court held that the
allegations supported a claim for misrepresentation under
Section 402B of the Restatement; however, no economic
damages are allowed in an action under Section 402B.
Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claim for negligent
misrepresentation was not allowed. Ritter v. Custom
Chemicides, Inc., 912 S.W.2d 128 (Tenn. 1995).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
IMPORT FEES . The California Department of Food
and Agriculture imposed an inspection fee on ships and
airplanes carrying agricultural goods into California from
foreign countries. No such fee was imposed on agricultural
goods carriers from other states, however, and the court held
that the inspection fee violated the Foreign Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution because the state failed to
demonstrate any justification for the discriminatory fee.
Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n v. California, ARD
(CCH) ¶ 402-818 (Calif. 1995).
TRESPASS
TIMBER . The plaintiff owned timber land neighboring
the defendant’s timber land. The defendant contracted with
a third party to harvest timber and hired a surveyor to mark
the property line. The surveyor was found to have
negligently failed to mark the line between the plaintiff’s
and defendant’s properties, resulting in the taking of $4,500
of timber belonging to the plaintiff. The court held that
Tenn. Code § 39-3-1316, effective at the time the timber
was cut, allowed the plaintiff damages for double the value
of the timber taken, because the timber was taken
negligently. Ghant v. Morrow, 911 S.W.2d 733 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1995).
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  SEMINAR IN PARADISE   
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING by Dr. Neil E. Harl
January 6-10, 1997
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1997! Balmy trade
winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand beaches and
the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar
on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl.
The seminar is scheduled for January 6-10, 1997 at the
beautiful ocean-front Royal Waikoloan Resort on the Big
Island, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. each
day, Monday through Friday, with a continental breakfast
and break refreshments included in the registration fee.
Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 400 page
seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning:
Annotated Materials which will be updated just prior to the
seminar.
     Here are the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment
payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation
and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date,
special use valuation, handling life insurance, marital
deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize tax
over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping
transfer tax.
  • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future
interests, handling estate freezes, and "hidden" gifts.
  • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including
income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private
annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part
sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living
trusts.
   • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two,
corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited
liability companies.
The Agricultural Law Press has made arrangements for
discount air fares on United Airlines and discounts on hotel
rooms at the Royal Waikoloan, the site of the seminar.
Th  seminar registration fee is $645 for current
subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest or the
Agricultural Law Manual. The registration fee for
nonsubscribers is $695.
Watch your mail for more details or call Robert
Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958.
ISSUE INDEX
Adverse Possession
Possession 50
Bankruptcy
General
Estate property 50
Jurisdiction 50
Federal taxation
Automatic stay 51
Claims 51
Discharge 51
Passive activity losses 51
Priority 51
Federal Agricultural Programs
Crop insurance 51
Federal Estate and Gift Tax
Charitable deduction 51
Disclaimers 51
Generation skipping transfers 52
Marital deduction 52
Power of appointment 52
Valuation 52
Federal Income Taxation
Business expense 53
C Corporations
Loan or capital contribution 53
Casualty losses 53
Cooperative 53
Depreciation 53
Employee benefits 53
Like-kind exchanges 53
Mitigation credits 54
Pension plans 54
Rescission 54
Rent deduction 54
Returns 54
S Corporations
Passive investment income 54
Reorganization 54
Trusts 54
Sale of Residence 54
Safe harbor interest rates
April 1996  55
Theft losses 55
Travel expenses 55
Products Liability
Damages 55
State Regulation of Agriculture
Import fees 55
Trespass
Timber 55
